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he Arctic Sunrise case1 was brought unilaterally by the Netherlands 
against the Russian Federation under the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (LOSC or the Convention) on October 4, 2013.2 The 
claim stated that in September 2013, the Russian Federation had boarded 
and arrested the Arctic Sunrise and detained its crew. The actions taken by 
the Russian Federation were in response to a protest staged involving the 
by boats of the Arctic Sunrise, which was chartered and operated by the en-
vironmental organization Greenpeace, in the vicinity of Prirazlomnaya, an 
offshore oil rig located in the Russian Federation’s exclusive economic 
zone operating under a Russian license. Although the arrest and detention 
of the Arctic Sunrise and its crew raise significant human rights law issues, 
the arbitration initiated by the Netherlands under the LOSC was primarily 
concerned with the law of the sea.3 According to the Netherlands, the flag 
State of the Arctic Sunrise, the vessel was exercising the freedom of naviga-
tion guaranteed by the LOSC, to which the Netherlands and the Russian 
Federation are both parties. Thus, in the view of the Netherlands, the Rus-
sian Federation’s actions against the Arctic Sunrise constituted a violation of 
the LOSC.4 The Dutch position is based on the premise that only the 
                                                                                                                      
1. The Arctic Sunrise arbitration thus far comprises two judgments, the first on juris-
diction and the second on further jurisdictional matters and the merits. See respectively, 
The Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Neth v. Russ), Case No. 2014-02, Award on the Merits 
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015) [hereinafter Award on the Merits]; The Arctic Sunrise Arbitration 
(Neth v. Russ), Case No. 2014-02, Award on Jurisdiction (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2014) [hereinaf-
ter Award on Jurisdiction]. The case summary with links to the judgments can be found at 
https://pcacases.com/web/view/21 (last visited Aug. 8, 2016). 
2. Submission of Dispute to Arbitration, The Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Neth v. 
Russ), Case No. 2014-02 (Oct. 4, 2013), www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases 
/case_no.22/Request_provisional_measures_en_withtranslations.pdf [hereinafter Submis-
sion of Dispute]. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, arts. 280–82, Dec 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter LOSC]. 
3. For a further discussion of the background to the Arctic Sunrise incident and its 
human rights dimension, see Alex G. Oude Elferink, The Arctic Sunrise Incident: A Multi-
Faceted Law of the Sea Case with a Human Rights Dimension, 29 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF 
MARINE AND COASTAL LAW 244 (2014). 
4. Submission of Dispute, supra note 2, ¶¶ 4–5. 
 
 








Netherlands, as the vessel’s flag State, was entitled to take enforcement 
action against the Arctic Sunrise in the location where the boarding took 
place, and that the Russian authorities could therefore only have boarded 
the vessel with its consent.5 In dealing with the legality of the arrest of the 
Arctic Sunrise, the arbitral tribunal focused in particular on the question 
whether the Russian Federation had effected the arrest after a hot pursuit 
from the safety zone around the Prirazlomnaya. Article 111 of the LOSC 
states that where the conditions for hot pursuit are met, a coastal State can 
effect the arrest of a vessel without the consent of the flag State in mari-
time areas where such consent would otherwise be required. 
In reaction to the initiation of the arbitral proceedings by the Nether-
lands, the Russian Federation stated that it did not accept the arbitral pro-
cedure under Annex VII of the LOSC and that it refused to participate in 
the proceedings.6 Nevertheless, the Russian Federation commented a 
number of times on the legal aspects of the arbitration. The Russian Feder-
ation set out why it rejected the jurisdiction of the tribunal and, just prior 
to the tribunal’s award on the merits in August 2015, the Russian Federa-
tion issued a position paper commenting on various aspects of the case.7 
Furthermore, a spokesperson of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
commented on the award on the merits immediately after it was rendered.8  
This article assesses the interaction of the Russian Federation with the 
arbitral proceedings in the Arctic Sunrise case despite its non-participation in 
the proceedings. The article focuses on the legal arguments advanced by 
the Russian Federation. To place these arguments in proper perspective, 
the article also considers the reasoning and conclusions of the arbitral tri-
                                                                                                                      
5. See Note from Legal Affairs Directorate, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands, to the Embassy of the Russian Federation (Sept. 29, 2013), 
www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.22/Request_provisional_measu
res_en_withtranslations.pdf. 
6. See Note No. 11945 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 
to the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Moscow (Oct. 22, 2013), www. 
itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.22/Note_verbale_Russian_Federatio 
n_eng.pdf [hereinafter Note No. 11945]. 
7. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, On Certain Legal Issues 
Highlighted by the Action of the Arctic Sunrise Against Prirazlomnaya Platform (Aug. 5, 2015), 
www.mid.ru/documents/10180/1641061/Arctic+Sunrise.pdf/bc7b321e-e692-46eb-bef2-
12589a86b8a6 [hereinafter Certain Legal Issues]. 
8. Commentary of the Official Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Russian Federation M.V. Zakharova Regarding the Arbitral Award in the Case of the 













bunal and makes its own assessment of the applicable law. Before turning 
to the legal arguments, Section II first provides a brief overview of the 
rules applicable to compulsory third party dispute settlement under the 
LOSC and introduces the different stages of the Arctic Sunrise case. Section 
III then discusses the Russian Federation’s views on the jurisdiction of the 
tribunal in the Arctic Sunrise case. Section IV considers the arbitral tribunal’s 
reasoning in relation to a number of aspects of the regime of hot pursuit. 
Section V then examines the Russian arguments that the arrest of the Arctic 
Sunrise was possible without a hot pursuit from the safety zone of the 
Prirazlomnaya. Finally, Section VI sets out some concluding remarks. 
 
II. COMPULSORY THIRD PARTY DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDER THE 
LOSC AND THE ARCTIC SUNRISE PROCEEDINGS 
 
Part XV of the LOSC establishes an elaborate dispute settlement regime. 
To a large extent, Part XV defers to the Convention’s States parties in de-
termining the means to settle disputes concerning its interpretation or ap-
plication.9 However, Article 286 provides that “[s]ubject to section 3, any 
dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention 
shall, where no settlement has been reached by recourse to section 1, be 
submitted at the request of any party to the dispute to the court or tribunal 
having jurisdiction under this section.” Section 3 of Part XV limits the ap-
plicability of compulsory dispute settlement procedures and allows States 
to exclude certain matters from these procedures.10 As will be set out be-
low, these limitations and exceptions played a role in the Arctic Sunrise case. 
The LOSC offers States parties a number of options in submitting a 
dispute to a third party, but in a case where the State initiating the proceed-
ings and the defendant have not opted for the same procedure, arbitration 
in accordance with Annex VII to the Convention is the default mecha-
nism.11 This was the case in the Arctic Sunrise proceedings. Annex VII pro-
vides that the arbitral tribunal shall in principle be constituted by the par-
ties, but also provides for a procedure in case the parties fail to agree on 
the constitution of the tribunal.12 The Netherlands nominated an arbitrator 
in its application for the institution of proceedings, while the other arbitra-
tors were chosen by the President of the International Tribunal for the Law 
                                                                                                                      
9. See, e.g., LOSC, supra note 2, arts. 280–82. 
10. Id., arts. 297–98. 
11. Id., art. 287(5). 
12. Id., Annex VII, art. 3. 
 
 








of the Sea (ITLOS), in accordance with Article 3 of Annex VII of the 
Convention. 
Non-appearance in international legal procedures in not unique to the 
Arctic Sunrise case. In the recent Annex VII arbitration initiated by the Phil-
ippines against China’s claims in the South China Sea, China similarly re-
jected the jurisdiction of the tribunal and refused to participate.13 In anoth-
er high-profile case before the International Court of Justice, Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America), the United States did not participate in the merits stage of the 
proceedings after losing in the jurisdictional stage.14 A State’s decision not 
to appear, however, does not prevent proceedings from moving forward. 
Article 9 of Annex VII of the Convention provides that when a party fails 
to appear, the “other party may request the tribunal to continue the pro-
ceedings and to make its award.” In doing so, the tribunal is required to 
establish jurisdiction over the dispute and satisfy itself that “the claim is 
well founded in fact and law.” Furthermore, when there is a dispute con-
cerning the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal, as will invariably be the case 
if one of the parties refuses to participate in the proceedings, the court or 
tribunal concerned is competent to determine its jurisdiction.15 This provi-
sion is similar to the rules on non-appearance of other international courts 
and tribunals.16   
In the Arctic Sunrise case, the Netherlands asked the tribunal to deter-
mine that the Russian Federation breached the LOSC by failing to partici-
pate in the proceedings.17 The award, however, does not contain a ruling 
on this point.18 While non-appearance of a party does not affect the bind-
                                                                                                                      
13. The South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013-19, Award 
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016), https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/175/2016/07/PH-
CN-20160712-Award.pdf. 
14. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar v. U.S.) 1986 
I.C.J. 226 (June 27). The terms “non-appearance” and “non-participation” are used inter-
changeably in this article. 
15. LOSC, supra note 2, art. 288(4). 
16. See e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 53, June 26, 1945, 59 
Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993. 
17. Award on the Merits, supra note 1, ¶ 4. 
18. The question as to whether there is a duty to appear in international law has never 
been decided by a court or tribunal. Different views have been advanced in the literature 
on the legal consequences of non-appearance. See Matthias Goldman, International Courts 












ing nature of the final decision of the court or tribunal,19 it may complicate 
the determination of the relevant facts. As the tribunal in the Arctic Sunrise 
case observed, the non-participation of the Russian Federation “made the 
Tribunal’s task more challenging than usual. In particular, it has deprived 
the Tribunal of the benefit of Russia’s views on the factual issues before it 
and on the legal arguments advanced by the Netherlands.”20 As will be set 
out below, the non-participation of the Russian Federation may have had a 
significant impact on the outcome of the arbitration.21 
The Arctic Sunrise case played out in a number of stages. Prior to the es-
tablishment of the Annex VII tribunal, the Netherlands asked for provi-
sional measure to preserve its rights from the ITLOS.22 The ITLOS indi-
cated provisional measures through an order of November 22, 2013. The 
order largely granted the provisional measures as requested by the Nether-
lands, ordering the Russian Federation to release the Arctic Sunrise and its 
crew.23 The Russian Federation communicated the reasons for its non-
participation in the proceedings to the Netherlands, the ITLOS and the 
arbitral tribunal, invoking a declaration it had made on becoming a party to 
the Convention, which excluded certain types of disputes from the com-
pulsory settlement mechanisms under the Convention in accordance with 
its Article 298.24 The Annex VII tribunal in response to the communication 
of the Russian Federation decided to treat it as a plea on jurisdiction,25 
                                                                                                                      
LAW, ¶ 14 (Aug. 2006), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/ 
law-9780199231690-e39. 
19. LOSC, supra note 2, art. 296(1). This was explicitly confirmed by the tribunal in 
the Arctic Sunrise case. Award on the Merits, supra note 1, ¶ 10.  
20. See Award on the Merits, supra note 1, ¶ 19. 
21. See infra text accompanying notes 64 to 70. 
22. This possibility exists under LOSC, supra note 2, art. 290(5). 
23. The “Arctic Sunrise” Case (Neth v. Russ), Case No. 22, Order of Nov. 22, 2013, ¶ 
105, http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.22/Order/C22_Or 
d_ 22_11_2013_orig_Eng.pdf [hereinafter Order]. For further discussion on the Tribu-
nal’s order see, e.g., Richard Caddell, Platforms, Protestors and Provisional Measures: The Arctic 
Sunrise Dispute and Environmental Activism at Sea, 45 NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 358 (2014); Oude Elferink, supra note 3, at 280–87. For a discussion of the 
Russian Federation’s reaction to the Tribunal’s order, see id. at 286–87. 
24. Note No. 11945, supra note 6; Note No. 3838 from the Embassy of the Russian 
Federation in Berlin to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (Oct. 22, 2013), 
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.22/Note_verbale_Russ
ian_Federation_eng.pdf [hereinafter Note No. 3838]; Note No. 487 from the Embassy of 
the Russian Federation in The Hague to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (Feb. 27, 
2014), http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1315 [hereinafter Note No. 487]. 
25. Award on Jurisdiction, supra note 1, ¶¶ 5–6, 48. 
 
 








notwithstanding the fact that the Russian Federation had indicated that it 
continued to refuse to take part in the proceedings and abstained from 
commenting on matters of substance and procedure.26 The tribunal issued 
an award on the significance of the Russian declaration for its jurisdiction 
on November 26, 2014, finding that the declaration did not prevent it from 
exercising jurisdiction.27 The tribunal ruled on other issues of jurisdiction 
and admissibility and the merits in its award of August 24, 2015. A decision 
on the amount of compensation that is due to the Netherlands under a 
number of items was reserved for a subsequent stage of the proceedings.28 
 
III. THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S VIEW ON 
THE JURISDICTION OF THE TRIBUNAL 
 
The only legal ground the Russian Federation invoked to reject the arbitra-
tion initiated by the Netherlands was its declaration under Article 298 of 
the LOSC. A couple of points are to be noted about the Russian Federa-
tion’s invocation of the declaration in the context of the arbitral proceed-
ings. First, the Russian diplomatic note only refers to the fact that the dec-
laration indicated that the Russian Federation “does not accept the proce-
dures, provided for in section 2 of Part XV of the [LOSC], entailing bind-
ing decisions with respect to disputes . . . concerning law-enforcement ac-
tivities in regard to the exercise of sovereign rights or jurisdiction.”29 The 
diplomatic note does not refer to the fact that the declaration provides that 
it is made in “in accordance with article 298 of the Convention.”30  
Article 298 does indeed allow States parties to exclude disputes con-
cerning law enforcement activities from compulsory dispute settlement 
mechanisms.31 However, the Article specifies that this is only the case for 
“disputes concerning law enforcement activities in regard to the exercise of 
sovereign rights or jurisdiction excluded from the jurisdiction of a court or 
                                                                                                                      
26. See Note No. 487, supra note 24. It may be noted that the tribunal in any case 
would have had to assess the impact of the Russian declaration as per LOSC, Annex VII, 
art. 9. 
27. Award on Jurisdiction, supra note 1, ¶ 79(1). 
28. Award on the Merits, supra note 1, ¶ 401(L). 
29. See Note no. 11945, supra note 6; Note No. 487, supra note 24.  
30. Declaration of the Russian Federation upon Ratification of the LOSC, Mar. 12, 
1997, www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm (last 
visited Aug. 8, 2016). 












tribunal under article 297, paragraph 2 or 3.”32 Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Arti-
cle 297 are concerned with marine scientific research and fisheries, two 
aspects that were not at issue in the Arctic Sunrise incident. On the other 
hand, paragraph 1 of Article 297, to which no reservations or exceptions 
are allowed by the LOSC, is relevant in this incident. Although Article 
297(1) in principle excludes disputes pertaining to the interpretation or 
application of the LOSC concerning the exercise by a coastal State of its 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction as defined in the LOSC, the section goes 
on to state that these disputes are nonetheless subject to compulsory pro-
cedures in a number of specific cases. One of those specific cases concerns 
situations in which it is alleged that the coastal State has acted in contraven-
tion of the provisions of the Convention in regard to the freedom of navi-
gation. The Arctic Sunrise incident falls under this provision.33 Summarizing 
this argument, the dispute involving the Arctic Sunrise was not covered by 
the declaration of the Russian Federation excluding certain types of dis-
putes from compulsory settlement. 
Second, invoking a declaration under Article 298 does not lead to an 
automatic termination of proceedings. Rather, the court or tribunal that is 
seized of the dispute will have to make a decision on this matter in connec-
tion with the determination of its jurisdiction.34 As far as can be ascer-
tained, the Russian government did not issue an official statement follow-
ing the Annex VII tribunal’s award on jurisdiction in relation to the article 
298 declaration.  
The matter of the tribunal’s jurisdiction was revisited in a commentary 
by Maria Zakharova, an official spokesperson of the Russian Ministry of 
Foreign, after the tribunal issued its award on the merits. Her statement 
was limited to stating that the Russian Federation “remains of the view that 
the tribunal does not have jurisdiction in relation to this case.”35 No further 
explanation was offered as to why the Russian Federation retained that 
view. The spokesperson’s commentary does raise a number of points that 
appear to challenge the award on the merits. The commentary observes 
that the award does not take into account all aspects of the incident and 
                                                                                                                      
32. Id. 
33. Oude Elferink, supra note 3, at 277. 
34. See also Caddell, supra note 23, at 367; Oude Elferink, supra note 3, at 276–78. For 
the Annex VII tribunal’s discussion of the implications of the Russian declaration for its 
jurisdiction, see Award on Jurisdiction, supra note 1, ¶¶ 39–45.  
35. Zakharova, supra note 8. 
 
 








ignores the legal norms and practice of court’s applicable to the case.36 In 
this connection, the commentary expresses regret that the award on the 
merits does not take into account the Russian position paper, which sets 
out extensive State practice reacting to the illegal actions of Greenpeace at 
sea.37 In light of the timing of the position paper, which was issued a cou-
ple of weeks before the tribunal was to render its award on the merits, this 
complaint sounds rather hollow.38 The commentary further adds that the 
award on the merits on a whole range of matters is not beyond reproach 
and contains clear errors, specifically mentioning that the award does not 
properly characterize the legal status of the Russian Federation as a contin-
uer State of the Soviet Union.39 Indeed, footnote 186 of the award refers to 
the Russian Federation as a successor State of the Soviet Union. At the 
same time, it may be noted that this qualification in no way affects the 
award’s reasoning to reach its decision on the merits.  
Determining whether the possibility exists to challenge the award on 
the merits in the Arctic Sunrise case, as is suggested by the spokesperson of 
the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, requires identifying the possible 
grounds for such a challenge. The Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure 
adopted by the International Law Commission in 1958 list the following 
grounds:  
 
(a) That the tribunal has exceeded its powers; 
(b) That there was corruption on the part of a member of the tribunal; 
(c) That there has been a failure to state the reasons for the award or a se-
rious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure;  
                                                                                                                      
36. The commentary refers to the fact that the Russian authorities are in the process 
of making a detailed assessment of the award (id.). At the time of writing of this article the 
website of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (http://www.mid.ru/home) did not 
contain any further information on this matter (based on a search of the website for the 
term “Арктик Санрайз” on June 1, 2016). The most recent hit was the commentary of 
August 25, 2015. 
37. Zakharova, supra note 8. The Tribunal, in its Award on the Merits, resolved to not 
take formal action on the position paper. The Tribunal pointed out that the paper had 
been brought to its attention at a very late stage, while the Russian Federation previously 
had not participated in the case; that the Russian Federation did not consider the paper to 
be a formal submission; and that the Tribunal was “satisfied that the relevant issues [were] 
fully addressed in this Award.” (Award on the Merits, supra note 1, ¶ 68). 
38. As will be further set out below in Section V, the legal arguments contained in the 
position paper are not altogether convincing. 












(d) That the undertaking to arbitrate or the compromis is a nullity.40 
 
The commentary of the Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson does not even 
start to make a case that any of these grounds is met. An Annex VII tribu-
nal is competent to deal with issues concerning the interpretation and ap-
plication of the LOSC and in that connection may also apply other rules of 
international law not incompatible with it.41 The award is fully reasoned 
and there is no indication that the tribunal departed from its rules of pro-
cedure. As a matter of fact, the tribunal offered the Russian Federation 
every opportunity to participate in the proceedings and in its award took 
care to fully take into account all available evidence.42 The award considers 
all possible grounds for exercising jurisdiction over the Arctic Sunrise the 
Russian Federation might have invoked, had it participated in the proceed-
ings.43 The basis for the undertaking to arbitrate in this case is provided by 
the LOSC, to which both the Russian Federation and the Netherlands are a 
party, and the application of the Netherlands instituting proceedings is in 
accordance with Article 286 of the Convention. 
 
IV. HOT PURSUIT 
 
The right of hot pursuit provides an important tool for coastal States un-
dertaking law enforcement actions at sea. The difficulties involved in such 
actions may make it impossible to arrest a vessel in the coastal State zone in 
which an infraction has occurred. Once a ship has left that zone, the 
coastal State in principle does not have a right to effect an arrest. To ad-
dress this situation, international law recognizes the right of hot pursuit. 
This right allows a coastal State to effect an arrest beyond the zone in 
which the infraction took place, including on the high seas and in the mari-
time zones of other States that are beyond the outer limits of their territori-
al seas.44  
                                                                                                                      
40. Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure (Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 
1958, vol. II, ¶ 22 at 83), art. 35. For a further discussion of this topic, see, e.g., Karin 
Oellers-Frahm, Judicial and Arbitral Decisions, Validity and Nullity, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (July 2013), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.10 
93/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e53?rskey=herE7w&result=1&prd=OP 
IL. 
41. LOSC, supra note 2, arts. 288(1), 293(1). 
42. Award on the Merits, supra note 1, ¶¶ 19, 71. 
43. Id., ¶¶ 236–333. 
44. LOSC, supra note 2, art. 111(3). 
 
 








The LOSC addresses certain specific conditions that apply in exercising 
the right of hot pursuit. First, the right of hot pursuit commences when the 
foreign ship or its boats are still inside the maritime zones in which the 
infraction is believed to have taken place. Second, hot pursuit may only be 
continued beyond that zone if it has not been interrupted. Third, hot pur-
suit may be undertaken “only by warships or military aircraft, or other 
ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government 
service and authorized to that effect.”45  
The right of hot pursuit was first codified in Article 23 of the United 
Nations Convention on the High Seas.46 The substantive regime of Article 
23 is reflected in Article 111 of the LOSC, but Article 111 extends beyond 
the territorial sea and the contiguous zone to the exclusive economic zone 
and the continental shelf and makes explicit reference to the safety zone 
around continental shelf installations.47  
In the Arctic Sunrise case, the award on the merits interprets and applies 
a number of aspects of Article 111, thus making the case an important con-
tributor to the law of hot pursuits. Apart from the general interest and in-
terpretation of the regime of hot pursuit, the findings of the tribunal are 
also of interest for the Russian Federation’s legal characterization of the 
incident. In this regard, this section will comment on the following issues: 
safety zones as a separate zone under the regime of hot pursuit; the condi-
tion that the pursuit has to be started in the zone in which the infraction 
takes place; the requirement that the pursuing vessel or aircraft has to be 
clearly marked and identifiable; and the condition that the pursuit may not 
be continued after it has been interrupted. 
The arrest of the Arctic Sunrise took place beyond the safety zone of the 
Prirazlomnaya, in which the alleged violations of Russian legislation oc-
curred. This raised the question whether the safety zone is a separate zone 
for the purposes of the regime of hot pursuit in the sense that infractions 
of legislation applicable to an installation or in its safety zone may only be 
enforced inside the safety zone or after a hot pursuit from that zone. The 
award rather laconically confirms that this is the case, observing that: 
 
The first prerequisite for the legitimate exercise of the right of hot pur-
suit, set out in Article 111(1) of the Convention, is that the competent au-
thorities of the coastal State must have good reason to believe that the 
                                                                                                                      
45. Id., arts. 111(1), 111(4). 
46. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 11. 












vessel being pursued has violated the laws or regulations of that State. 
The laws and regulations in question are those applicable under the Con-
vention in the area at hand. In the present case, the applicable laws and 
regulations are those applicable in safety zones established around artifi-
cial islands, installations, and structures in the [exclusive economic 
zone].48 
 
Some further clarification of this conclusion by the tribunal perhaps would 
have been called for. First, it may be noted that Article 111 refers to the 
safety zones around continental shelf installations but does not include a 
reference to artificial islands and structures on the shelf nor does it refer-
ence any of these three types of construction in the exclusive economic 
zone. The award, on the other hand, does make reference to artificial is-
lands, installations and structures in the exclusive economic zone. It could 
be said that this is a reasonable interpretation of Article 111(2) of the Con-
vention, as there would seem no justification to distinguish between these 
three types of constructions or between the continental shelf and the ex-
clusive economic zone. However, Articles 60 and 80 of the LOSC do make 
separate reference to the three types of constructions. At the same time, 
the Convention is not completely coherent in its references to man-made 
constructions. For instance, Article 87 refers to “artificial islands and other 
installations.” 
Second, while Article 111 does include a separate reference to conti-
nental shelf installations, the implication of this is not completely clear. 
Article 111(2) indicates, by using the word “or,” that it applies, on the one 
hand, to the exclusive economic zone and, on the other hand to the conti-
nental shelf, including safety zones around continental shelf installations, 
which might seem to suggest that safety zones are subsumed in the conti-
nental shelf. At the same time, that interpretation would make the separate 
reference to the safety zone of continental shelf installations superfluous. 
The tribunal’s view that the safety zone of installations has to be treated as 
a separate zone in the regime of hot pursuit is supported by the general 
approach to enforcement jurisdiction in coastal State maritime zones.49 The 
coastal State may take enforcement actions if a ship is in the maritime zone 
                                                                                                                      
48. Award on the Merits, supra note 1, ¶ 247. 
49. See Oude Elferink, supra note 3, at 259. It may be noted that Article 111 is not 
very carefully drafted on this point. Under Article 80 of the LOSC the coastal State has 
jurisdiction over artificial islands, installations and structures on its continental shelf. A 
literal interpretation of Article 80 would imply that the coastal State only has a right of hot 
pursuit from the safety zone of installations. 
 
 








in which the infraction took place. This might suggest that the coastal State 
could take enforcement action against the infraction of legislation applica-
ble in a safety zone anywhere in its continental shelf or exclusive economic 
zone. However, a safety zone is a special zone within the continental shelf 
or exclusive economic zone, in which the coastal State has additional rights 
that it does not otherwise have in the continental shelf or exclusive eco-
nomic zone.50 This indicates that enforcement jurisdiction in relation to 
these rights only exists inside the safety zone, just like enforcement jurisdic-
tion in relation to maritime zones in general cannot be exercised beyond 
their outer limits, absent a hot pursuit.51 This same argument is applicable 
to the exercise of enforcement jurisdiction by the coastal State on the in-
stallation itself.  
On the basis of the evidence before it, the tribunal reached the conclu-
sion that the first order to stop, a requirement to start a hot pursuit, had 
probably only been given after the boats of the Arctic Sunrise had left the 
safety zone around the Prirazlomnaya.52 As the tribunal observed, Article 
111(1) provides that the pursuit “must be commenced when the foreign 
ship or one of its boats” is within the maritime zone concerned. However, 
the tribunal then continued by observing that paragraphs 1 and 4 of Article 
111 set out a slightly different test.53 Article 111(4) indicates that the pursuit 
may only begin after the “pursuing ship has satisfied itself by such practi-
cable means as may be available” that the pursued ship or its boats are 
within the limits of the maritime zone concerned. According to the tribunal 
the “latter formulation suggests that the location of the foreign ship at the 
time of the first stop order should not be evaluated with the full benefit of 
hindsight, but rather looked at from the perspective of the pursuing 
ship.”54 On the basis of the available facts and evidence, the tribunal con-
cluded that the Russian coast guard vessel Ladoga “should be seen” as hav-
ing satisfied the latter text.55  
                                                                                                                      
50. See also Summary Records of the 69th Meeting, [1950] 1 Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission 231, ¶¶ 59–60, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4.SER.A/1950. 
51. The exception of course being the territorial sea, in which case the coastal State 
may also take enforcement action in the contiguous zone. LOSC, supra note 2, art. 33. 
However, this point rather confirms the position in relation to the safety zone. Unlike in 
the case of the territorial sea and the contiguous zone, no provision is made for exercising 
enforcement jurisdiction beyond the safety zone, save for the exception of hot pursuit. 
52. Award on the Merits, supra note 1, ¶ 266.  














It is questionable whether the tribunal’s interpretation of Article 111 on 
this point is correct. Moreover, the tribunal’s interpretation seems to intro-
duce an undesirable measure of subjectivity. Article 111(1) is concerned 
with the question as to what requirements have to be met for the right of 
hot pursuit to exist. This includes the objective test that the foreign ship or 
its vessels “must be” in the maritime zone concerned. Article 111(4) on the 
other hand is concerned with an altogether different matter. It establishes 
the conditions under which hot pursuit will have been deemed to have 
begun, and it does not address the parameters of the right of hot pursuit 
itself. While allowing the coastal State a margin of discretion in the latter 
case, due to the practical difficulties a vessel may have while operating at 
sea, that margin of discretion should not be used to change the nature of 
the right of hot pursuit. The tribunal supports its interpretation by referring 
to the limited dimensions of the safety zone, which leave the coastal State 
little time to make the relevant determinations for starting a hot pursuit if a 
vessel or its boats leave that zone.56 First, it should be questioned whether 
practical considerations in relation to one specific zone should play a role 
in interpreting the provisions on hot pursuit that are generally applicable to 
all coastal State maritime zones. Second, this practical argument would not 
seem to be relevant either in the present case, or arguably in other similar 
cases that would warrant a hot pursuit from a safety zone of an installation. 
In the present case, the actions of the Arctic Sunrise were directed at the 
Prirazlomnaya and played out over a considerable period of time. A deter-
mination whether a hot pursuit should eventually be initiated or not could 
have been made in that time frame and did not have to wait until the mo-
ment the boats started leaving the safety zone. 
The tribunal also seems to stretch the applicable law in relation to the 
requirement that the pursuing vessel or aircraft has to be “clearly marked 
and identifiable as being on government service.” The Arctic Sunrise was 
boarded from a helicopter that, as the tribunal observes, “was unmarked 
save for a red star on its bottom side.”57 The tribunal then concludes that 
although “the helicopter was unmarked and the men descending from it 
did not, in the recollection of the crew of the Arctic Sunrise, identify them-
selves, the Tribunal is satisfied, in context, that the vessel was boarded by 
Russian officials. This is apparent from their subsequent actions.”58 This conclu-
sion clearly contradicts Article 111(4), which in no way indicates that the 
                                                                                                                      
56. Id., ¶ 267. 
57. Id., ¶ 100. 
58. Id., ¶ 101 (emphasis added). 
 
 








requirements set out in it may be met or replaced by a test of subsequent 
conduct.59 
The last point in the tribunal’s assessment as to whether or not hot 
pursuit provided the Russian Federation with a legal basis to arrest the Arc-
tic Sunrise was whether the hot pursuit had been continuous or had been 
interrupted. Once a pursuit is interrupted beyond the zone in which it is 
initiated, it may not be recommenced at a later stage.60 The tribunal held 
that the actions of the Russian coast guard vessel Ladoga at first were in line 
with a hot pursuit.61 However, according to the tribunal, it was apparent 
that the Ladoga’s  
 
later conduct is not consistent with continuous pursuit, the final objective 
of which would have been to board, as soon as possible, the pursued 
ship. The conduct of the Arctic Sunrise was also not consistent with that of 
a pursued ship, as it remained in the area and did not try to flee.62 
 
In this connection, the tribunal pointed out that there were discussions 
between the Ladoga and the Arctic Sunrise concerning two of the crew of the 
latter that were on board the Ladoga and that the Arctic Sunrise was allowed 
to deliver items for these crew members to the Ladoga.63 
The tribunal also entertained the option that the Ladoga may have con-
sidered that it was not in a position to effect an arrest by itself and may 
have awaited reinforcements—previous attempts by the Ladoga to board 
the Arctic Sunrise having failed.64 The tribunal rejected this possibility, refer-
ring to a witness statement of one of the officers of the Ladoga, gunnery 
officer Marchenkov. According to the tribunal, gunnery officer Marchen-
kov: 
 
described the moment when the Ladoga’s conduct changed as follows: 
 
                                                                                                                      
59. It should be acknowledged that this finding of the tribunal is included in its factu-
al overview of the case and not its discussion of the law. Still, it does imply an assessment, 
which is not a factual description and that moreover is relevant to the interpretation of 
Article 111. In addition, it was not necessary to make this finding as it was not relevant to 
determining the claims of the parties. 
60. LOSC, supra note 2, art. 111(1). 
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. . . It was about this time that our ship’s commanding officer re-
ceived the order to unload our gun mounts . . . At this point, we 
continued shadowing the vessel beyond the 3-mile zone around 
the platform. We ceased these manoeuvres at the point when, on 
19.09.2013, a helicopter arrived which, at 18:21, took up position 
(hovering) over the vessel “Arctic Sunrise.” 
 
It is noteworthy that, after recording both the initial authorisation to fire 
warning shots and the order to unload the gun mounts received by the 
Ladoga, Mr. Marchenkov does not refer to any further orders received af-
ter 9:30 on 18 September 2013.65  
 
The events as described by the tribunal could be said to support its conclu-
sion that the Ladoga remained in the vicinity of the Arctic Sunrise to prevent 
further actions against the Prirazlomnaya and not to continue the hot pur-
suit.66 However, a number of considerations suggest that this conclusion 
may be more problematical than would appear at first sight. First, the tri-
bunal observes that the final objective of a hot pursuit should be to board 
the pursued ship as soon as possible. No such requirement is included in 
the LOSC and, as the tribunal’s observations indicate, a pursuing ship may 
need to wait for reinforcements to effect a boarding. Second, the tribunal 
refers to the fact that, based on gunnery officer Marchenkov’s statement, 
the Ladoga apparently did not receive any further orders after the order to 
unload its gun mounts. However, neither does the statement indicate that 
there was an order to discontinue the hot pursuit. In addition, the fact that 
the gunnery officer was aware of the order to unload the gun mounts does 
not necessarily imply that he was informed of all communications between 
the commanding officer of the Ladoga and his superiors. Finally, remaining 
in the vicinity of the Arctic Sunrise to prevent further actions against the 
Prirazlomnaya does not necessarily exclude the continuation of the hot pur-
suit at the same time. 
It would seem that in judging the question whether a hot pursuit is in-
terrupted or not, the intent of the coastal State authorities, who are respon-
sible for deciding on the matter, should in principle be decisive. The Arctic 
Sunrise was eventually boarded by Russian authorities. That is a clear indica-
tion on the part of the Russian authorities that there was an intent to go 
through with the enforcement action that had been initiated by the hot 
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pursuit. The fact that the Ladoga continued to follow the Arctic Sunrise may 
be explained in different ways, but does not positively point to an intention 
to interrupt the pursuit. On the other hand, the dealings between the Arctic 
Sunrise and the Ladoga in relation to the two crew members of the Arctic 
Sunrise on board the Ladoga indeed seem difficult to square with the inten-
tion to continue a hot pursuit.  
There is a paucity of material on the matter how to determine when a 
hot pursuit has been interrupted in the circumstances described above. 
Martens submits that when there exists doubt on this point, the intention 
of the master of the ship carrying out the pursuit should be determinative.67 
On the other hand, Poulantzas criticizes this position, observing that it  
 
would be precarious . . . to base such an element as the continuity of the 
pursuit on such subjective factors as the intention of the master of the 
pursuing vessel, [who] is one of the parties involved in the pursuit. The 
determination of element of continuity of pursuit should rely on objective 
and real criteria.68 
 
This observation would seem to be equally applicable to other authorities 
of the coastal State. However, Poulantzas also indicates that intention may 
be made objective, by e.g. recording the intent to continue the pursuit in 
the logbook of the pursuing vessel.69 As the award in the Arctic Sunrise case 
indicates, intention may not always be readily ascertainable on the basis of 
the available evidence. In the final analysis, the main difficulty in making a 
determination whether or not the hot pursuit was continuous or not in the 
Arctic Sunrise case was the non-participation of the Russian Federation in 
the proceedings. The tribunal largely had to rely on a witness statement of 
gunnery office Marchenkov of the Ladoga, which only provides a cursory 
account of the communications between the vessel and the Russian author-
ities. It has to be assumed that the Russian Federation would have been in 
a position to shed further light on this matter, had it participated in the 
proceedings.70  
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68. Id. at 214–15. 
69. Id. at 215. 
70. The Russian Federation submitted that Russian authorities were not exercising the 
right of hot pursuit in boarding and arresting the Arctic Sunrise. See Certain Legal Issues, supra 












V. THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S POSITION PAPER 
 
The position paper of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Fed-
eration, which was circulated shortly before the award on the merits in the 
Arctic Sunrise case was rendered, rejects the view that hot pursuit had a role 
to play in the boarding and arrest of the Arctic Sunrise.71 Instead, the paper 
submits that, in the circumstances of the case, the Russian Federation 
could arrest the Arctic Sunrise anywhere in its exclusive economic zone.72 
The paper sets out a number of arguments to support this position. First, 
because the actions of Greenpeace were directed against an installation and 
posed a threat to the rights and interests of the Russian Federation and the 
operator, they “are incompatible with the freedom of navigation, may not 
be regarded as an exercise thereof and fall under the exclusive jurisdiction 
of Russia as the coastal State over installations in its [exclusive economic 
zone].”73 Or as the paper also argues, the Arctic Sunrise “was deliberately 
violating law and order rather than exercising the freedom of navigation.”74 
Second, apart from claiming that specific actions may lead to a loss of the 
freedom of navigation, the position paper seeks to excise the rights to free-
dom of expression and of peaceful assembly from the freedoms of the high 
seas.75 Third, the paper submits that the actions of the Russian Federation 
were aimed at protecting “its sovereign right to safely exploit mineral re-
sources of its continental shelf and its [exclusive economic zone] without 
unauthorized illegal interference and to exercise to this end the exclusive 
jurisdiction over installations in its [exclusive economic zone] vis-à-vis the 
vessel.” Finally, the position paper points out that the limited size of the 
safety zone around an installation makes it “hardly possible” to intercept 
boats acting from a vessel in the safety zone. Moreover, the Russian Feder-
ation also had an interest in arresting the Arctic Sunrise itself, which had 
remained outside the safety zone.76 
The arguments of the position paper to justify the boarding and arrest 
of the Arctic Sunrise without a hot pursuit from the safety zone merit some 
comment. The first and third arguments are both based on the assumption 
that legislation created pursuant to a coastal State’s prescriptive jurisdiction 
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over installations and their safety zones can be enforced throughout the 
coastal State’s entire exclusive economic zone. In this connection, the third 
argument conflates the rights a coastal State generally has over the re-
sources of the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf with the 
specific jurisdiction the coastal State has over installations under Article 60 
of the LOSC. This position is problematical. As Article 56 of the LOSC, 
which recognizes the sovereign rights of the coastal State over the re-
sources of the exclusive economic zone, indicates, the coastal State has 
jurisdiction over installations “as provided for in the relevant provisions” 
of the Convention. Article 60 provides that the coastal State has exclusive 
jurisdiction over installations. There is no indication in Article 60 that this 
jurisdiction extends beyond the installation.77 To the contrary, Article 60 
indicates that even in the safety zone of an installation the coastal State 
only has limited enforcement powers. In that zone the coastal State “may 
take appropriate measures to ensure the safety both of navigation and of 
the artificial islands, installations and structures.”78 This qualification would 
not have been necessary if the argument of the Russian Federation con-
cerning enforcement jurisdiction in relation to installations would be cor-
rect. The approach of the Russian Federation also is difficult to square with 
the separate reference to the safety zones of continental shelf installations 
in Article 111.79  
The Russian Federation’s suggestion that the actions of the Arctic Sun-
rise led to a loss of its freedom of navigation is only true in a limited sense. 
Ships of all States enjoy the freedom of navigation and “other internation-
ally lawful uses of the sea” related to that freedom.80 In this connection, 
Article 58(2) provides that Articles 88 to 115, setting out the regime of the 
high seas, apply also to the exclusive economic zone to the extent they are 
not incompatible with Part V of the Convention, which sets out the regime 
for that zone. Article 92(1) of the LOSC provides that on the high seas 
ships shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their flag State, “save 
in exceptional cases expressly provided for in international treaties or this 
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Convention.”81 In the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf 
this may concern cases of infraction of legislation of the coastal State appli-
cable to those zones.82 However, that legislation has to be in accordance 
with the Convention.83 In consequence, there is no loss of the freedom of 
navigation as such, but only specific limitations on the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the flag State as provided for in the Convention. 
The Russian Federation’s position paper provides a number of argu-
ments to support the view that the freedom of expression and peaceful 
assembly do not form part of the freedom of navigation.84 First, it is sub-
mitted that these human rights belong to individuals, while the freedom of 
navigation, as is indicated by Articles 86 and 87, belong to States.85 This is a 
surprising argument. Activities on the high seas in most instances are car-
ried out by private actors, not State organs. The link with the State is estab-
lished through the rules on attribution of nationality contained in the Con-
vention and other rules of international law. Second, the position paper 
submits that human rights “are individual rights governed by a cluster of 
international law separate from the law of the sea”.86 Such a compartmen-
talization of international law is not supported by the Convention. For 
instance, Article 58 of the Convention provides that the freedom of naviga-
tion in the exclusive economic zone comprises other lawful uses of the sea 
related to that freedom and paragraph 2 of Article 58 provides that “other 
pertinent rules of international law apply to the exclusive economic zone in 
so far as they are not incompatible with Part V.” There is an extensive 
body of human rights case law confirming that human rights can apply 
beyond the territory of States and that they are not incompatible with the 
law of the sea.87  
The Russian argument on the separate nature of human rights and 
freedom of navigation seems to derail when the paper submits that it is 
possible to exercise human rights at sea without at the same time exercising 
the freedom of navigation, for instance when a ship is in the territorial sea 
in which foreign ships do not enjoy the freedom of navigation.88 However, 
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from the fact that a ship may be used in connection with a protest in a 
zone in which it does not enjoy the freedom of navigation, it does not logi-
cally follow that a ship does not enjoy the freedom of navigation in zones 
in which that freedom exists, because it is used in connection with the ex-
ercise of a human right. The remainder of section eight of the position 
paper is concerned with setting out the limitations that may apply to the 
exercise of human rights at sea and is premised on the position that “[t]he 
Russian Federation respects the rights to freedom of expression and peace-
ful assembly exercised in accordance with international law, including when 
they are exercised at sea.”89 Section eight does not spell out the conse-
quences of the separate nature of human rights and the freedom of naviga-
tion. Presumably, the Russian Federation’s respect for human rights exer-
cised in accordance with international law by a vessel engaged in the free-
dom of navigation, implies that in this instance it would defer to the exclu-
sivity of flag State jurisdiction.90  
Finally, the position paper’s argument concerning the difficulty of car-
rying out an arrest in a safety zone to justify arrest beyond the zone is of a 
practical nature. This argument does not justify reconfiguring the jurisdic-
tional framework set out in the LOSC. In addition, as was set out above, 
the limited size of a safety zone may be less of a problem to exercising the 
right of hot pursuit than would appear at first sight.91 
In addition to arguing that the arrest of the Arctic Sunrise without a hot 
pursuit from the safety zone of the Prirazlomnaya was in accordance with 
the LOSC, the paper submits there is an 
 
emerging pattern of coastal States’ practice with respect to (a) unaccepta-
bility and illegality of those Greenpeace malicious activities and (b) legali-
ty and necessity of protective and law enforcement measures undertaken 
by a coastal State against foreign vessels and their crews involved into 
these activities, without the need to seek prior consent of a flag State.92 
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To substantiate this claim the position paper refers to an International Mar-
itime Organization (IMO) Assembly resolution and reviews national court 
cases dealing with incidents involving similar actions by Greenpeace.93 Ac-
cording to the position paper, IMO Assembly Resolution A.671 (16) “is 
silent about the need for the coastal State to seek the flag State’s consent 
before taking action.”94 This is true but disingenuous. As the paper 
acknowledges, the resolution provides that in case of an infringement of a 
safety zone, the coastal State “should take action in accordance with inter-
national law.”95 That is, the resolution does not define the scope of en-
forcement jurisdiction of the coastal State, but refers to relevant rules of 
international law, which are primarily those contained in the LOSC.96  
Second, the position paper presents an impressive range of statements 
of government representatives condemning similar actions at sea by 
Greenpeace and it discusses a number of national court cases concerned 
with those actions.97 Impressive as this practice may seem at face value, in 
reality it does not provide any support for the Russian position that it was 
entitled to arrest the Arctic Sunrise anywhere in its exclusive economic zone 
for the infraction of Russian legislation applicable to installations and their 
safety zones.98 A couple of examples suffice to illustrate this point.99 The 
paper refers to a 1994 case involving the Norwegian authorities.100 Howev-
er, this case was involved with a Greenpeace action directed against whal-
ing in Norway’s exclusive economic zone. The Convention accords the 
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coastal State enforcement jurisdiction in relation to living resources in its 
entire exclusive economic zone, making this case irrelevant for the relation 
between jurisdiction over installations and in the exclusive economic zone 
generally.101   
The position paper also refers to an incident involving the rig Stena Don 
in the exclusive economic zone of Greenland and describes how the 
Greenlandic police arrested a number of activists and seized a helicopter 
used by Greenpeace in connection with the action.102 As is apparent from 
the source that is cited in this connection,103 the activists were arrested 
while they were at the rig and the helicopter was seized in the town of 
Qeqertarsuaq, in Greenlandic territory.104 It may also be noted that in two 
cases involving similar incidents, Greenlandic courts distinguished between 
the jurisdiction of Greenland over continental shelf installations and their 
safety zones and the continental shelf generally. According to the courts, 
the extended jurisdiction over such installations and their safety zones im-
plies that they “are regarded as Danish territory as far as the extent of the 
sphere of application of Danish law is concerned [. . . ] even though [they] 
are located in the area of the shelf outside the outer territorial waters.”105 
At this point, it is appropriate to briefly consider why the position pa-
per tries to argue that the Russian Federation was entitled to arrest the Arc-
tic Sunrise without the consent of its flag State beyond the safety zone of the 
Prirazlomnaya, without relying on hot pursuit. As the discussion above 
about hot pursuit indicates, it would well have been possible to make a case 
that the Russian Federation had properly exercised the right of hot pur-
suit.106 This position would have been uncontroversial as regards the appli-
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cable law and raises only the question whether the Russian Federation had, 
in fact, met all the requirements of Article 111 of the LOSC in the case at 
hand. Conversely, as is argued above, neither international law nor State 
practice support the alternative position that a vessel can be lawfully arrest-
ed without the consent of a flag State, beyond the safety zone of a conti-
nental shelf installation, without a hot pursuit from that zone, for infrac-
tions of legislation applicable only to the installation or its safety zone.  
In the absence of further information on the internal deliberations of 
the Russian authorities leading up to the arrest of the Arctic Sunrise, the rea-
son for the Russian Federation to not rely on the right of hot pursuit will 
remain speculative. One explanation for the Russian position may be that 
the Russian authorities concluded that the requirements for hot pursuit 
under Article 111 had not been met. However, in view of the fact that au-
thors of the position paper do not seem to have been particularly troubled 
about ignoring difficult aspects of the Russian case, it would have been 
possible to deal with a hot pursuit scenario in the same way. Two other 
explanations, which are complementary, are possible. First, the Russian 
Federation may have wanted to avoid the impression that it was largely in 
agreement with the tribunal, by only disagreeing with respect to the factual 
circumstances relating to the execution of the hot pursuit. Second, the Rus-
sian Federation may have wanted to send a clear signal to Greenpeace and 
similar organizations that it would not let itself be constrained by the re-
gime of hot pursuit in taking future enforcement actions. During a seminar 
in Saint Petersburg,107 it was suggested that the position paper was primari-
ly intended to stall the award of the tribunal. This explanation does not 
seem very likely. At the time the position paper was published, the tribunal 
very likely would have had completed or near-completed drafting its award 
and the position paper did not offer any new evidence that would have 
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required the tribunal to reconsider its conclusion that the hot pursuit had 
been interrupted. This consideration reinforces the argument that the Rus-
sian authorities at the time were not interested in a meaningful dialogue 
with the tribunal, but rather wanted to distance themselves as much as pos-




The Russian Federation has justified its refusal to participate in the arbitral 
proceedings in the Arctic Sunrise case with reference to its declaration under 
Article 298 of the LOSC excluding compulsory dispute settlement in cer-
tain instances. A review of the declaration shows that it is not applicable in 
the circumstances of the case under consideration. At the same time, the 
Article 298 declaration probably offered the only pretext to provide some 
legal justification for the Russian Federation’s non-participation. Similar 
conclusions apply to the commentary by an official spokesperson of the 
Russian Ministry of Foreign, after the tribunal had issued its award on the 
merits, which raised a number of issues that seemed to be intended to chal-
lenge the award. As is set out in section III of this article, when the award 
is assessed against legal criteria for challenging judicial decisions it can be 
concluded that the commentary does not even start to make a case that any 
of these grounds is met. 
Section IV considers the reasoning of the tribunal in the Arctic Sunrise 
case in relation to the regime of hot pursuit. The award confirms that the 
safety zones around installations are separate zones in the context of Arti-
cle 111 of the LOSC, although it would perhaps have been welcome if the 
award would have further developed this point. The award makes two con-
troversial findings in relation to the regime of hot pursuit—one concerning 
the requirement for the initiation of hot pursuit by the pursuing vessel, and 
the other concerning the marking and identification of such vessels and 
aircraft. Both these findings allowed the tribunal not to reach conclusions 
                                                                                                                      
108. Another example of the critical approach to the award on the merits is provided 
by the statement of the spokesperson of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who 
expresses serious worry that the award condones protests that are not peaceful and hinder 
lawful activities (Zakharova, supra note 8). However, it may be noted that the legality of 
the protests was not at issue before the tribunal and the tribunal did not make any ruling 
in this respect. As a matter of fact, the tribunal circumscribes the right to protest at sea 
with, among others, reference to the right of the coastal State to protect its legitimate 












that would have gone against the Russian Federation. That might be a wel-
come outcome in the circumstances of the case, as it avoided giving the 
Russian Federation, as a non-participating State, additional grounds to crit-
icize the award. However, as the findings of the tribunal actually shift the 
balance of rights between coastal States and the international community 
reflected in Article 111, a different outcome on these points would have 
been preferable. The non-participation of the Russian Federation in the 
proceedings almost certainly hindered the tribunal in assessing whether or 
not the hot pursuit of the Arctic Sunrise at some point had been interrupted 
by the Russian authorities. Although additional arguments could have been 
entertained by the tribunal, the award’s conclusion that the hot pursuit was 
not continuous was not unreasonable in the light of the available evidence. 
The Russian Federation’s position paper commenting on the Arctic Sun-
rise incident, which is discussed in section V, rejects the tribunal’s argument 
that hot pursuit from the safety zone of the Prirazlomnaya was required to 
allow arrest of the Arctic Sunrise without the consent of its flag State. Alt-
hough the paper does an excellent job in setting out the limitations that 
apply to the right to protest at sea and presents abundant State practice in 
this respect, it fails to satisfactorily argue the main argument that reliance 
on hot pursuit was not required in the circumstances of this specific case. 
As a matter of fact, none of the national court cases that are discussed sup-
port this point. In considering the reasons for the Russian approach in the 
position paper, it is concluded that the Russian authorities at the time ap-
parently were not interested in a meaningful dialogue with the tribunal, but 
rather wanted to distance themselves as much as possible from the reason-
ing of the tribunal. Finally, it may be noted that the Russian Federation’s 
attempt to expand coastal State jurisdiction over foreign navigation in the 
exclusive economic zone concerns a very specific case and it does not nec-
essarily mean that it will be applied by analogy to different cases. 
 
